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Nuclear Reaction: U.S. Tests Response To an Atomic Attack

Recent Top-Secret Exercise
Is First of Kind Since '56;
Flying in Doomsday Plane

By JOHN J. FIALKA

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—It was on the fourth day of the nuclear crisis when hundreds of Soviet missiles hit their targets in the U.S.

The President died where he was sitting, in the cramped "Situation Room" beneath the White House. Instantaneously, command over the nation's remaining civilian and military resources shifted to his successor as a nuclear strike was called to retaliate. Meanwhile, critical functions of the federal government continued, operating from hundreds of locations scattered throughout the U.S.

This was the scene in a huge, world-wide nuclear war game that was secretly directed from the White House during the first five days of March. As described by high government officials, the game—code-named "Ivy League"—was the first complete exercise of the military and civilian command structures and communications systems to be used in all-out nuclear war since 1956.

The "war" was directed from the White House by former Secretary of State William P. Rogers, who acted as the "President." Richard Helms, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency and ambassador to Iran, played the Vice President.

President Is Reassured

Although the game produced some tense, confused moments in the Situation Room, it reportedly convinced President Reagan and the galaxy of his top national security officials who watched it that the nation has the plans and the capability to maintain continuity of government during a nuclear strike.

"We did a lot better than we thought we would," says one player. He explains that the exercise was devised to act on the philosophy of President Reagan and other top administration officials that "protection of key government functions during a crisis is as much of a deterrent to nuclear war as building new strategic nuclear weapons systems."

The officials who describe the game, and who request anonymity, say one objective in discussing the game is "to make sure that the other side is aware that we have the capability." They say the game involved the movement of over 1,000 civilian and military players throughout the world, including two unidentified Reagan Cabinet members who are in line to succeed President Reagan, should he die in an attack.

A number of deputy and under secretaries of cabinet agencies acted as members of the National Security Council, while President Reagan, Vice President George Bush, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr., Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, the President's national security adviser, William P. Clark Jr., and other security-council members looked on.

"No Fault" Procedure

Mr. Rogers, a New York lawyer, and Mr. Helms, currently the head of a Washington consulting firm, Saffee Co., were picked by President Reagan and Vice President Bush for the roles of the President and Vice President. The game was designed to create a "no fault" atmosphere, where mistakes could be made and lessons learned without necessarily telegraphing what a U.S. official might do in such a crisis.

During the last week in February, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Helms and the officials of the game's mock National Security Council were told that the world situation had deteriorated. The response of both the Soviet and U.S. governments to the deepening crisis had been to order mobilization for war. After attacks on U.S. forces in Europe, South Korea and in Southwest Asia, war had been declared.

The players in the Situation Room were then told that Soviet tactical nuclear weapons had been used against a U.S. ship in the North Atlantic and that chemical munitions had been fired at some U.S. troop units overseas, resulting in a large number of casualties.

The "President," after studying options provided by the office of the Joint Chiefs, decided to use tactical nuclear weapons in response to the chemical attack and later began giving permission for the release of tactical warheads elsewhere on a case-by-case basis as the tempo of the enemy attacks accelerated.

One major debate among participants in the room involved the question of when to disperse potential successors to the presidency. Another involved the timing of the release of U.S. military units to help state and local governments manage their evacuation and other civil-defense roles.

As one major player describes it, the decisions were made swiftly, although the choices were disturbing. "You're right up against something that has never happened before," he says.

(Mr. Rogers says of the game, "I am not in a position to talk about it." Mr. Helms says he is under similar strictures. The sources say that no NATO commands were used during the game, although some Canadian military headquarters participated in parts of it.)

"Ivy League" players simulated the use of the "hotline," the teletype link with Soviet leaders, repeatedly using it to explain U.S. moves and intentions in an attempt to alleviate the deepening crisis.

The game included simulated Soviet destruction of U.S. satellites. Air Force players simulated the procedures needed to fill gaps in the U.S. system by launching new satellites.

The ultimate moment occurred late in the fourth day, when the mock North American Air Defense Command reported a major incoming Soviet missile attack. At that point, technicians began switching off major pieces of the U.S. military and civilian communications systems used by the Pentagon and the Federal Emergency Management Agency to simulate the destruction.

"Ivy League" posited a "worst case" Soviet nuclear strike, some 5,000 megatons raining down on the nation. (The first atomic bomb, the one that incinerated Hiroshima, Japan, had a strength of about 20,000 tons of TNT, or one-fiftieth of a megaton.)

The game also assumed that Soviet targeters would attempt what is called by military planners a "decapitation strike," an effort to destroy Washington and the entire federal command structure.

At that point in the game, with the President "dead," control over the "war" shifted first to Mr. Helms, who as the pretend Vice President, spent part of the time aloft in the National Emergency Airborne Command Post, a specially equipped Boeing 747 that has been described in the press as the "Doomsday Plane."

Later, control shifted to each of two Cabinet officers, one in a secret federal facility in Massachusetts and the other at a similar facility in Texas. There, the two men, accompanied by "core teams" of officials from key government agencies, took command of the nation's remaining civilian and military resources.

A fourth "miniature White House" was established in a U.S. embassy in Europe to simulate what would happen if a successor to the President, such as the Secretary of State, was consulting with U.S. allies when a nuclear war broke out.

The ground rules of the game called for the President and his successors to use what is called the Single Integrated Operations Plan, the plan for a major nuclear strike in retaliation against a Soviet ICBM attack on the U.S. The pretend security-council members involved in the game were top-level officials. They included Thomas Reed, a former Secretary of the Air Force who now is a consultant to Mr. Clark, the President's national security adviser; Walter Stoessel, deputy secretary of state; Fred Ikle, under secretary of defense, and Air Force Gen. James E. Dalton, staff director of the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

On March 5, when the game ended, President Reagan placed a conference call to all the command centers used during the exercise, telling the players:

"While we pray to God that we will never have to use the procedures you have tested the past week, the nation is better off for what has been done."

President Reagan added that "the exercise will not only improve our ability to respond to such a critical emergency—but, more importantly, the lessons learned will ultimately help us prove that our adversaries have nothing to gain by such an attack."

The Chilean message

Earlier this month The Globe published a section of Henry Kissinger's memoirs centering on the disingenuous claim that "our government had nothing to do with planning [Salvador Allende's] overthrow and no involvement with the plotters" who carried out the 1973 military putsch in Chile. On the same day there were reports in The Globe and other major American newspapers describing the Reagan Administration's plans for covert action to "destabilize" the leftist government of Nicaragua.

There are, of course, significant differences between Nicaragua today and Chile in 1973. In Nicaragua there is no protofascist group of upper-level military officers trained by American instructors and imbued with the strategic and political doctrines of their instructors. The Nicaraguan army is a Sandinist army, and so any American attempt to overthrow the regime must pass through the risky stage of forming paramilitary bands to sabotage power stations and blow up bridges.

Two bridges were blown up this month. The drastic reaction of the Sandinist authorities, who declared a state of emergency and suspended democratic rights, takes into account the haunting precedent of American complicity in the overthrow of Allende. This means discounting Kissinger's rather desultory effort at disinformation.

In mid-September, 1970, after Allende was elected president of Chile but before his election had been ratified by the Chilean Congress, Richard Nixon, Kissinger, John Mitchell and former CIA director Richard Helms set in motion a secret plan to get rid of Allende.

Helms has testified that Nixon instructed him to "play a direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat in Chile to prevent Allende's accession to the presidency." This plan was codenamed Track 2. Kissinger himself has said Track 2 meant "encouraging a more direct role for the CIA and actually organizing a coup."

After a White House meeting involving Kissinger, Helms and the CIA's deputy director of plans, Thomas Karamessines, a cable was sent to the CIA station in Santiago ordering the

agency's in-country team to "(1) create a coup climate by propaganda, misinformation and terrorist activities; (2) collect intelligence on coup-minded officers; and (3) inform those coup-minded officers that the US government will give them full support in a coup short of direct US military intervention."

What happened to Track 2 after Allende was ratified and allowed to take office? The CIA's Karamessines told a congressional committee that "Track 2 never really ended. What we were told to do in effect was, well, Allende is now president... but continue our efforts." Karamessines, the ultimate insider, said: "The seeds that were laid in 1970 had their impact in 1973."

The Church Committee's report on "Covert Action in Chile" was even more specific in its finding that, by January, 1972, the CIA's Santiago station "had successfully penetrated" the group that would make the 1973 coup "and was in contact through an intermediary with its leader." The report said that "the CIA received intelligence reports on the coup planning... throughout the months of July, August and September 1973." The report added that the agency's efforts "went beyond the mere collection of information."

There is no point getting angry at Kissinger for trying to cover up these old crimes. He is merely doing what is expected of him. One month after Chile succumbed to the barbarous reign of a military dictatorship, William Colby, then director of the CIA, told a congressional committee: "The presumption under which we conduct this type of operation is that it is a covert operation and that the United States' hand is not to show."

Kissinger's perfunctory rewrite of history, if taken seriously, would merely make it more difficult to understand contemporary events in Nicaragua. Were Kissinger himself a loyal member of the Sandinistas' ruling directorate, we may be sure that he would spot Washington's gloved hand in the bombing of two Nicaraguan bridges.


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WASHINGTON TALK

Briefing

A Helms Encounter

Street scene: Richard Helms, the career spy, is strolling down K Street, watching the world with a carefree gaze.



"Hi, Dick," a passing acquaintance says. The former Director of Central Intelligence appears off on some pastoral fantasy; he does not quite register recognition. But then he smiles and silently returns the greeting with a casual and, in his case, suddenly most suggestive gesture. He uses his hand as though pointing and shooting an imaginary gun at the man who greeted him. The friend passes by; the tableau is terminated without extreme prejudice.

Francis X. Clines
Warren Weaver Jr.

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BONN INVESTIGATES SECURITY OFFICIAL

Magazine Says He Persuaded
C.I.A. to Have Nazi Papers
in the U.S. Suppressed

By JOHN VINOCUR

Special to The New York Times

BONN, March 3 — The chief federal prosecutor today ordered an investigation of a West German security officer described by a magazine as having arranged with the Central Intelligence Agency to suppress documents in the United States about the Nazi connections of former Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger.

The official was also said by the magazine to have disclosed that the West German intelligence agency sought to recruit an "agent of influence" to lead President Nixon to think favorably about West Germany.

The investigation was ordered into Hans Langemann, a department chief in the Bavarian Interior Ministry. A spokesman for the ministry said Mr. Langemann, who worked for the intelligence agency from 1957 to 1970, was suspended from his post on Tuesday.

The federal prosecutor, Kurt Rebmann, also announced that an inquiry was being conducted to determine if the author of the magazine article, Jürgen Saupe, had disclosed state secrets.

Leftist Magazine Konkret

The article, appearing in the leftist magazine Konkret, involves eight cases in which Mr. Langemann was said to be involved. The magazine said it had eight hours of tape recordings containing Mr. Langemann's disclosures. The suspended official's lawyer insisted, however, that parts of the recordings did not originate with Mr. Langemann.

The magazine said it was told by Mr. Langemann in 1968 that the intelligence agency sought to stop what it thought would be a series of possible disclosures by journalists of documents from the National Archives in Washington that

would have tended to discredit Mr. Kiesinger, who had been a member of the Nazi Party.

Mr. Langemann was quoted as saying that he met with Richard Helms, the former head of the C.I.A., in Washington on Feb. 2, 1968, to tell him of the concern felt in Bonn about the documents.

According to the account, Mr. Helms directed Mr. Langemann to a man whose name was given as Mr. Hart, a C.I.A. employee described as a Nazi expert.

"Destroying the documents was out of the question," the magazine said. "So another way out was found. If the documents could not be destroyed, finding them in the giant microfilm archives could be made extremely difficult, practically impossible.

"To do so, it was necessary to take the 'Guide to films of captured documents' out of circulation. It was done."

Mr. Langemann was quoted as saying that Mr. Hart turned over 58 volumes of the so-called guide to German authorities. The magazine printed a copy of what it said was a telex from the West German intelligence agency's resident in Washington reporting this to Mr. Langemann and suggesting that a special note of thanks be sent to Mr. Hart.

The magazine said the agency also arranged to get an "agent of influence" close to Mr. Nixon.

German Points of View

It quoted Mr. Langemann as saying: "We wanted to get close to Nixon. Not to get information out of him. Rather we wanted — that was the sense of the whole operation — to reach Nixon with German points of view from a friend with deep ties and financial relations."

Later, the magazine said, information was also sought from the so-called agent, who was described as an influential San Francisco Republican.

Mr. Langemann, who headed a section of the Bavarian Interior Ministry with a staff of 220, was said by his lawyer as having sought to stop publication of the account. The photocopies of purported documents appearing with the report did not come from Mr. Langemann, his lawyer said, and the magazine declined to disclose how they had been obtained.